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Analysts agree that public opposition is one of the main factors that hinder ambition in many
countries’ carbon pricing policy agenda. This article argues that motivated reasoning
contributes to this opposition by inducing the public to underestimate the effectiveness of
carbon pricing to mitigate climate change and yield co-benefits. This article also argues that
measures of implicit carbon pricing can help overcome public opposition to carbon taxes
and emissions trading schemes due to motivated reasoning. These measures are becoming
increasingly available thanks to recent work by the International Monetary Fund, the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and private-sector actors, and
therefore they offer a potential instrument for reducing public opposition to carbon taxes and
emissions trading schemes in various countries. A strength of the approach proposed in this
article – compared to some of the mainstream approaches to risk regulation – is that it tries
is to keep the regulation of climate risks in line with public attitudes towards these risks.
I. INTRODUCTION
The COVID-19 crisis has highlighted the challenge of catalysing public support for
policy action in situations where policies are costly but a delay can cause a severe
increase in social harm, such as climate change mitigation.1 Prominent economists
and policymakers support carbon pricing as a measure to mitigate climate change
cost-effectively,2 and the number of jurisdictions that have implemented carbon taxes
or emissions trading schemes (ETSs) has increased substantially in the last two
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dominioni@dcu.ie. I thank Patricia Cruz Marin, Dan Esty, Christine Jolls and the participants of the Work in Progress
Symposium at Yale Law School for their feedback and comments on an earlier version of this paper. I also thank Dan
Kahan and Tom Tyler for useful discussion. The usual disclaimer applies.
European Journal of Risk Regulation (2020), page 1 of 16 ©TheAuthor(s), 2020. Published byCambridge University Press
doi:10.1017/err.2020.102
1 D Klenert et al, “ Five Lessons from COVID-19 for Advancing Climate Change Mitigation” (2020) 76
Environmental and Resource Economics 751.
2 Recently, many economists, including twenty-seven Nobel Laureate Economists, four former chairs of the US
Federal Reserve and two former secretaries of the US Department of Treasury have signed a statement supporting
the introduction of a US carbon tax: see <https://www.econstatement.org/>. See also CPLC, “Report of the High-
Level Commission on Carbon Prices” (2017); IPCC, “Mitigation Pathways Compatible with 1.5°C in The Context
of Sustainable Development” (2018); IMF, “Fiscal Policies for Paris Climate Strategies-From Principle to Practice”
(2019).
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decades.3 However, when confronted with benchmark price levels, carbon pricing policy
in many parts of the world is not sufficiently ambitious to cost-effectively mitigate
climate change or to internalise the climate externality (measured as the social cost of
carbon).4 Low levels of public support for carbon pricing is a key factor that hinders
policy ambition in carbon pricing.5
Research shows that a key determinant of this opposition is that a large segment of the
public believes that carbon taxes and ETSs are not effective at reducing pollution and
delivering co-benefits, such as improved air quality, reduced traffic congestion and
reduced traffic accidents,6 although substantial evidence indicates the opposite.7 An
explanation for this mismatch between public expectations and the evidence is that
people underestimate the price elasticity of demand for carbon-intensive products.8
In this article, I put forward two claims. First, I build on the work of Lucas Jr9 and argue
that motivated reasoning is a factor that contributes to maintaining – or even increasing –
themismatch between the evidence and the perceived effectiveness of carbon pricing.My
second argument is that policymakers can use measures of implicit carbon pricing (ie
carbon prices imposed via fuel taxes and fossil fuel subsidies reforms10) to overcome
the motivated reasoning that hinders public support for explicit carbon pricing
instruments, such as carbon taxes and ETSs.
Measures of implicit carbon prices are becoming increasingly available thanks to the
growing interest of international institutions11 and private-sector actors.12 These
organisations provide estimates for a large number of countries, potentially allowing
governments in many parts of the world to increase public support for carbon taxes
and ETSs.
3 <https://carbonpricingdashboard.worldbank.org/map_data>.
4 G Dominioni and DHeine, “Behavioural Economics and Public Support For Carbon Pricing: A Revenue Recycling
Scheme To Address The Political Economy of Carbon Taxation” (2019) 19 European Journal of Risk Regulation 554;
World Bank, “State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2019” (2019).
5 A Baranzini and S Carattini, “Effectiveness, Earmarking and Labeling: Testing the Acceptability of Carbon Taxes
with Survey Data” (2017) 19 Environmental Economics and Policy Studies 197; S Carattini, M Carvalho and S
Fankhauser, “Overcoming Public Resistance to Carbon Taxes” (2018) 9 Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate
Change e531; World Bank, supra, note 4; IMF, supra, note 2.
6 S Dresner et al, “Social and Political Responses to Ecological Tax Reform in Europe: An Introduction to the Special
Issue” (2006) 34 Energy Policy 895; Carattini et al, supra, note 5.
7 On the effect of carbon taxes at reducing carbon emissions, see JJ Andersson, “Carbon Taxes and CO2 Emissions:
Sweden as a Case Study” (2019) 11 American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 1; B Murray and N Rivers, “British
Columbia’s Revenue-Neutral Carbon Tax: A Review of the Latest ‘Grand Experiment’ in Environmental Policy” (2015)
86 Energy Policy 674. On the air quality benefits in the USA, see TM Thompson et al, “A Systems Approach to
Evaluating the Air Quality Co-Benefits of US Carbon Policies” (2014) 4 Nature Climate Change 917; JJ Buonocore
et al, “Climate, Air Quality, and Health Benefits of a Carbon Fee-and-Rebate Bill in Massachusetts, USA” (2018)
13 Environmental Research Letters 114014. On the air quality benefits in China, see M Li et al, “Co-Benefits Of
China’s Climate Policy for Air Quality and Human Health in China and Transboundary Regions in 2030” (2019)
14 Environmental Research Letters 084006.
8 Carattini et al, supra, note 5.
9 GM Lucas Jr, “Voter Psychology and the Carbon Tax” (2017) 90 Temple Law Review 1.
10 I refer here exclusively to reforms to subsidies to fossil fuel consumption, not to production. See also World Bank,
supra, note 4.
11 OECD, “Effective Carbon Rates: Pricing CO2 through Taxes and Emissions Trading Systems” (2016); OECD,
“Effective Carbon Rates 2018: Pricing Carbon Emissions through Taxes and Emissions Trading” (2018); IMF,
supra, note 2.
12 VividEconomics and the Overseas Development Institute, “Estimating Effective Carbon Prices: Accounting for
Fossil Fuel Subsidies” (2019).
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This article has clear policy relevance. Policymakers are increasingly interested in
overcoming public resistance to carbon pricing, and communication is seen as a
critical tool for doing so.13 For instance, the World Bank has recently released a
guide on how to communicate about carbon pricing that includes the recommendation
to stress the co-benefits of carbon pricing in order to increase public support for these
measures.14 This article can inform these efforts.
This article contributes to the growing research on how citizens’ psychology affects
lawmaking and risk regulation.15 This article offers novel insights into how motivated
reasoning reduces lawmakers’ ability to pass critical climate legislation and offers
potential solutions to this problem. The solutions offered in this article aim to
overcome the psychological barriers to adequate public information on the costs and
benefits of carbon pricing. This approach, if effective, allows for the aligning of risk
regulation with public attitudes towards risks. As such, it has the potential advantage
of relying more on the input legitimacy of climate action than a traditional response
to public misperception of environmental risks,16 which focuses on increasing the
power of technical and relatively politically insulated authorities.17
The solutions proposed in this article also complement existing proposals on how to
increase ambition in carbon pricing policy18 and implement the “polluter pays” principle
in climate change mitigation.19 Previous legal scholarship has argued that motivated
reasoning due to identity and ideology may explain Republicans’ rejection of carbon
taxes in the USA and has offered some solutions to this issue.20 In this article, I
expand this research in two ways: by highlighting additional reasons why motivated
reasoning reduces public support for carbon pricing; and by offering novel solutions
to the problem.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: In Section II, I review the existing
research on behaviourally informed strategies to increase public support for explicit
carbon pricing and highlight its limits. Section III discusses the climate benefits and
co-benefits of carbon pricing and argues that low levels of public support for these
policy instruments are often due to public distrust towards the effectiveness of carbon
pricing at yielding these benefits. Section IV argues that motivated reasoning is a
13 World Bank, supra, note 4; IMF, supra, note 2; MA Pigato, Fiscal Policies for Development and Climate Action
(Washington, DC, World Bank 2019).
14 PMR-CPLC, Guide to Communicating Carbon Pricing (Washington, DC, World Bank 2018).
15 S Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University
Press 1993); D Kahan, “Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk Regulation” (2007) 741 University of Pennsylvania Law
Review. 156; D Kahan et al, “Motivated Numeracy and Enlightened Self-Government” (2017) 1(1) Behavioural Public
Policy 54; GM Lucas Jr and S Tasic, “Behavioral Public Choice and the Law” (2015) 118 West Virginia Law Review
199; P Slovic, “Trust, Emotion, Sex, Politics, and Science: Surveying the Risk-Assessment Battlefield” (1999) 19(4)
Risk Analysis 689.
16 For an example of this traditional approach to risk regulation, see Breyer, supra, note 15.
17 For a call in favour of this approach that keeps risk regulation aligned with public perception of risks, see Kahan
et al, supra, note 15.
18 I Ayres, “Voluntary Taxation and Beyond: The Promise of Social-Contracting Voting Mechanisms” (2017) 19
American Law and Economics Review 1; Carattini et al, supra, note 5; Dominioni and Heine, supra, note 4; Lucas
Jr, supra, note 9.
19 D Heine, M Faure and G Dominioni, “The Polluter-Pays Principle in Climate Change Law: An Economic
Appraisal” (2020) 10(1) Climate Law 94.
20 Lucas Jr, supra, note 9.
2020 Motivated Reasoning and Implicit Carbon Prices 3
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fr
om
 h
tt
ps
://
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e.
 Y
al
e 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 L
ib
ra
ry
, o
n 
01
 D
ec
 2
02
0 
at
 2
0:
24
:2
2,
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 th
e 
Ca
m
br
id
ge
 C
or
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 u
se
, a
va
ila
bl
e 
at
 h
tt
ps
://
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e/
te
rm
s.
 h
tt
ps
://
do
i.o
rg
/1
0.
10
17
/e
rr
.2
02
0.
10
2
factor that helps to maintain or even to increase public scepticism towards the
effectiveness of carbon pricing in delivering benefits. In this section, I also argue that
policymakers can use measures of implicit carbon pricing in order to overcome
opposition that is due to motivated reasoning and discuss the limits to this possibility.
Section V highlights a general limit to the use of measures of implicit carbon pricing
to address motivated reasoning and discusses some possible solutions. Section VI
concludes.
II. BEHAVIOURALLY INFORMED STRATEGIES TO INCREASE
PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR CARBON PRICING
Traditionally, governments address public opposition to explicit carbon pricing with
phasing-in (ie the practice of implementing carbon pricing instruments at a low price
and gradually increasing it over time). Governments widely adopt this practice,21 and
prominent scholars support it.22 While potentially useful, phasing-in also has severe
drawbacks, because it delays mitigation outcomes, may lead to overconsumption of
fossil fuels23 and may reduce public awareness of the benefits of carbon pricing
policy.24 Elaborating complementary strategies to address the political economy of
carbon pricing can help to limit the use of phasing-in. In this vein, a growing strand
of research proposes strategies to address public opposition to carbon pricing building
on insights from behavioural economics. In this section, I briefly review this research
and highlight some of its limits.
A complementarymeasure is to distribute citizens’ (forecasted) carbon revenues on visible
– but frozen – bank accounts before a carbon tax is implemented, and to unfreeze these
accounts only after the law is enacted.25 If the reform is blocked, recipients will lose cash
transfers.26 Antedating the cash transfers on visible bank accounts may increase public
support for the carbon tax because people tend to value more the things they have than
equal things that they do not have (ie the so-called endowment effect).27 Despite the
promise of this revenue recycling scheme increasing public support for carbon pricing, it
is not necessarily practicable in every jurisdiction for at least two reasons. On the one
hand, strategies that focus on carbon revenue use might not be feasible nor desirable in
countries that have alternative and more compelling fiscal needs, such as reducing a high
21 To have a sense of how commonly this strategy is used in practice (consciously or not), it is sufficient to look at the
evolution throughout time of the levels of carbon prices around the world. These data are available at the following link:
<https://carbonpricingdashboard.worldbank.org/map_data>.
22 Carattini et al, supra, note 5.
23 HW Sinn, “Public Policies against Global Warming: A Supply Side Approach” (2008) 15 International Tax and
Public Finance 360; F Van Der Ploeg and CWithagen, “Global Warming and the Green Paradox: A Review of Adverse
Effects of Climate Policies” (2015) 9 Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 285.
24 Dominioni and Heine, supra, note 4.
25 ibid.
26 ibid.
27 ibid.
4 European Journal of Risk Regulation Vol. 0:0
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public debt.On the other hand, the publicmaynot support this revenue recycling scheme, as it
sometimes does not support other types of nudges.28
Other proposals build on framing (ie the psychological phenomenon bywhich people’s
preferences towards a set of options vary depending on how the choice is presented, even
though the payoffs of the choices remain constant).29 For instance, in a 2019 report, the
World Bank suggests discussing the introduction of a carbon price as a form of subsidy
removal in order to reduce its perceived coerciveness.30 The idea underlying this proposal
is that the negative externalities of fuel consumption can be seen as a subsidy, if not
internalised.31 Carbon taxes can reduce or eliminate this subsidy. While appealing,
the effectiveness of this proposal is far from guaranteed, chiefly because it rests on a
theoretical premise (the economic theory of Pigouvian taxation) that might not be
particularly convincing or ethically appealing to segments of the general public.
Some research shows that naming a carbon tax as a “climate contribution” or “carbon
fee” reduces public opposition to these measures.32 These strategies are low cost and thus
easily implementable. Various jurisdictions seem to have adopted this strategy in recent
years. It is not uncommon to see carbon pricing bills in the USA use of the word “fee”
instead of “tax”, such as the 2018 Connecticut Bill 536333 and the 2020Maryland House
Bill 1543;34 the Federal government of Canada named its 2019 carbon pricing scheme
“fee”.35 While potentially useful, experience shows that this strategy sometimes fails to
catalyse sufficient public support for carbon taxes.36 For instance, in 2018, the
Washington Carbon Emissions Fee and Revenue Allocation Initiative was rejected in
a public ballot by almost 57% of the voters.37
Lucas Jr proposes various strategies to overcome public opposition to carbon pricing.38
For instance, he suggests relying on communication techniques such as identity
affirmation and pluralistic advocacy. Identity affirmation refers to the practice of
presenting information in a way that affirms values held by the target audience, and
pluralistic advocacy is to seek support for a policy (eg carbon taxes) from experts and
public figures associated with a diverse range of values and identities. While
28 On the public acceptability of nudges, see C Sunstein, The Ethics of Influence: Government in the Age of
Behavioral Science (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2016); C Sunstein, “Do People Like Nudges?” (2016)
68 Administrative Law Review 177. Of course, ethical considerations may also recommend not manipulating
citizens’ biases; see Lucas Jr, supra, note 9.
29 A Tversky andDKahneman. “The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice” (1981) 211(4481) Science
453.
30 Pigato, supra, note 13.
31 ibid.
32 Baranzini and Carattini, supra, note 5; S Kallbekken, S Kroll and TL Cherry, “Do You Not Like Pigou, or Do You
Not Understand Him? Tax Aversion and Revenue Recycling in the Lab” (2011) 62 Journal of Environmental Economics
and Management 53.
33 <https://www.cga.ct.gov/2018/TOB/h/2018HB-05363-R00-HB.htm>.
34 <https://legiscan.com/MD/text/HB1543/id/2128820>.
35 A popular video shows the PrimeMinister of Canada, Justin Trudeau, calling bymistake the carbon pricing scheme
“carbon tax” during a parliamentary audition, andmembers of the opposing parties laugh in response (see<https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=5ndd3YKEBxM>).
36 Lucas Jr, supra, note 9; B Rabe and CP Borick, “Carbon Taxation and Policy Labeling: Experience from American
States and Canadian Provinces” (2012) 29 Review of Policy Research 358, 360–80.
37 <https://ballotpedia.org/Washington_Initiative_1631,_Carbon_Emissions_Fee_Measure_(2018)>.
38 Lucas Jr, supra, note 9.
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potentially effective, the possibility of implementing pluralistic advocacy is dependent on
the political situation of each country. In countries where carbon pricing is a highly
contentious issue, it might be challenging to find experts or public figures from the
political side that opposes carbon pricing to support this policy publicly. Instead,
identity affirmation is often less constrained by the contingent political situation of a
country; below, I elaborate on how it could be implemented in practice in the context
of carbon pricing.
Lucas Jr also discusses various possibilities for manipulating voters’ biases to increase
their support for a carbon tax but highlights the limits of all these approaches.39 Options
include, for instance, adopting the carbon tax when the market price for gasoline is
falling, as suggested by Summers:40 consumers would be anchored to the higher
price, so they would therefore feel less the effect of the carbon tax on energy prices.
Besides the potential ethical concerns that manipulating voters’ biases may pose,41
Summers’ approach risks being a partial solution: if the market price for gasoline
rises, it can become difficult for governments to increase the carbon tax rate to reflect
the rising social cost of carbon. The French Yellow Vests experience supports this idea.
Lastly, Ayres proposes a social contracting mechanism in which citizens can express
their preferred provision points to increase voluntary participation in a carbon tax.42 This
study shows that allowing people to express their preferred provision point enables the
achievement of higher levels of support for a carbon tax compared to a situation in which
the provision point is exogenously determined.43 While potentially useful, the
applicability of this strategy might be limited in some contexts. For instance, applying
this strategy to the road transport sector might require setting up a system that applies
a differentiated price depending on whether the gasoline/diesel purchaser is a member
of the tax scheme or not. Some countries may not have the capacity to put in place
such a scheme and to effectively monitor compliance.
This short review highlights that, while the behaviourally informed research on
increasing public support for carbon pricing is growing quickly, there are still
challenges ahead. This article aims to contribute to this research by describing an
alternative strategy for overcoming public resistance to carbon prices. My proposal
also has limits, which I discuss below, and should be seen as complementary to the
approaches discussed above.
III. PUBLIC BELIEFS ABOUT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CARBON PRICING
This section discusses the climate benefits and co-benefits of carbon pricing and argues
that low levels of public support for these measures are often the result of public distrust
towards the effectiveness of carbon pricing at yielding these benefits.
39 ibid.
40 L Summers, “Let This Be the Year When We Put a Proper Tax on Carbon” (Financial Times, 5 January 2015)
<http://www.ft.com/content/10cbla60-9277-11e4-alfd-00144feabdcO>.
41 Lucas Jr, supra, note 9.
42 Ayres, supra, note 18.
43 ibid.
6 European Journal of Risk Regulation Vol. 0:0
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fr
om
 h
tt
ps
://
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e.
 Y
al
e 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 L
ib
ra
ry
, o
n 
01
 D
ec
 2
02
0 
at
 2
0:
24
:2
2,
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 th
e 
Ca
m
br
id
ge
 C
or
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 u
se
, a
va
ila
bl
e 
at
 h
tt
ps
://
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e/
te
rm
s.
 h
tt
ps
://
do
i.o
rg
/1
0.
10
17
/e
rr
.2
02
0.
10
2
1. The climate and non-climate benefits of carbon pricing
Substantial evidence indicates that carbon taxes are an effective instrument for curbing
carbon emissions.44 Andersson analyses the impact of the Swedish carbon tax on
emissions from transport fuels by using a synthetic control method.45 He finds that
the Swedish carbon tax reduced emissions by about 6% per year between 1990 and
2005. Murray and Rivers46 review the existing research on the abatement impact of
the British Columbia carbon tax. This research, conducted using various methods (eg
time-series analysis and difference in difference analysis), suggests that the British
Columbia carbon tax has reduced emissions by between 5% and 15% since its
implementation in 2008. Other research looks at the impact of ETSs on emissions. A
large part of this literature focuses on the EU ETS – the largest ETS worldwide in
terms of carbon emissions covered until the Chinese ETS will be fully implemented.
Bel and Joseph find that the abatements induced by the EU ETS in the period 2005–
2012 range between 33.78 and 40.76 MgT.47 Their article provides a more
conservative estimate of the abatements yield by the EU ETS than previous studies
because it better isolates the mitigation effects of the EU ETS from those of the 2008
economic crisis. Evidence on the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI)
suggests that, in the absence of this ETS, emissions in the consortium of north-
eastern US states could have been 24% higher from the start of this programme
(2009) to 2012.48
Research also indicates that carbon pricing can yield co-benefits, such as improved air
quality. For instance, Thompson and co-authors analyse the air quality-related health
benefits of a hypothetical US ETS in a scenario analysis.49 Their results suggest that,
while the health benefits of the policy vary per type of scenario, in some scenarios
they outweigh the economic costs of the policy.50 Another study finds that a
hypothetical carbon tax implemented in Massachusetts with a tax rate that increases
from US$10 to US$40 per tonne of carbon in the period 2017–2023 would save
about 340 lives, both in Massachusetts (about 63% of the total) and in nearby
states.51 Studies conducted outside of the USA confirm these results. For instance, a
study finds that if China implements a carbon price that is consistent with its
Nationally Determined Contribution pledge under the Paris Agreement to peak
emissions in 2030, air quality improvements will prevent about 160,000 premature
deaths.52
44 Andersson, supra, note 7; Murray and Rivers, supra, note 7.
45 Andersson, supra, note 7.
46 Murray and Rivers, supra, note 7.
47 G Bel and S Joseph, “Emission Abatement: Untangling the Impacts of the EU ETS and the Economic Crisis”
(2015) 49 Energy Economics 531.
48 BC Murray and PT Maniloff, “Why Have Greenhouse Emissions in RGGI States Declined? An Econometric
Attribution to Economic, Energy Market, and Policy Factors” (2015) 51 Energy Economics 581.
49 Thompson et al, supra, note 7.
50 ibid.
51 Buonocore et al, supra, note 7.
52 Li et al, supra, note 7.
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Carbon pricing can also yield other domestic co-benefits, such as improved energy
security related to the incentives to invest in renewable energy technology53 and
reduced traffic congestion and accidents if implemented in the road transport sector.54
2. Public distrust in the effectiveness of carbon pricing
Despite the evidence discussed in the previous section, in many countries, large segments
of the public are sceptical of the environmental effects of carbon pricing, and this
scepticism is a primary cause of public opposition to carbon taxes.55 For instance,
focus group research in Denmark indicates that many citizens see environmental taxes
as instruments to raise revenues and doubt their abatement effects; this study shows
that businesses share similar views.56
A survey conducted by Baranzini and Carattini in the Geneva canton (Switzerland)
finds that 52% of respondents do not trust that a carbon tax can reduce carbon
emissions.57 In addition, this study finds that many do not expect the measure to
deliver co-benefits: only 42% believe that the measure would yield health
improvements, and the share is even lower for traffic congestion (27%) and road
accidents (18%).58 Importantly, this study finds that beliefs about the environmental
effects of the carbon tax represent a strong predictor of support for the measure.59
Recent evidence from France hints in the same direction. Douenne and Fabre survey a
representative sample of the French population regarding their expectations on the
environmental effects of increasing the tax rate of the French carbon tax by €50 per
tonne of carbon on heating fuel and gas (one condition) or on gasoline and diesel
(other condition).60 Revenues from this hypothetical tax reform are rebated to
households. They find that only 17% of the respondents believe that the tax would be
effective at reducing pollution and fighting climate change, 66% do not believe that
the tax reform would be effective and the remaining answer: “Don’t know”.61 They
also find that beliefs about the environmental effects of the reform have a substantial
influence on its public acceptance.62
An explanation of why the general public does not trust the effectiveness of carbon
pricing is that the public understands environmental taxes as instruments that aim to
raise revenues in order to fund environmental projects. Therefore, these instruments
53 A Baranzini et al, “Carbon Pricing in Climate Policy: Seven Reasons, Complementary Instruments, and Political
Economy Considerations” (2017) 8 Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change e462.
54 I Parry, CVeung andDHeine, “HowMuchCarbon Pricing Is in Countries’Own Interests? The Critical Role of Co-
Benefits”, IMF Working Paper (2014).
55 Carattini et al, supra, note 5.
56 J Klok et al, “Ecological Tax Reform in Denmark: History and Social Acceptability” (2006) 34 Energy Policy 905.
57 Baranzini and Carattini, supra, note 5.
58 ibid.
59 ibid.
60 T Douenne and A Fabre, “Yellow Vests, Carbon Tax Aversion, and Biased Beliefs” (2020), working paper.
61 ibid.
62 ibid.
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are perceived as ineffective unless revenues are earmarked for green spending.63
Evidence on public preferences for carbon revenues spending supports this claim
because public support for carbon pricing tends to increase when revenues are
devoted to green spending.64 Data on carbon revenue use also corroborate the claim:
as of 2018, governments devote a large share of carbon revenues (almost 42%
worldwide) to supporting environmental policies.65 Relatedly, Carattini and
co-authors find that informing citizens of the environmental effects of carbon taxes
reduces public demand for green earmarking of carbon revenues.66 Another, not
necessarily incompatible, explanation of the mismatch between expectations and
reality is that people underestimate the price elasticity of demand for carbon-intensive
products (ie they underestimate how much a carbon tax can reduce the consumption
of these products).67
In the next section, I argue that motivated reasoning is an additional factor that
contributes to maintaining – or even increasing – the mismatch between the evidence
and the perceived effectiveness of carbon taxes. I also argue that governments can
use measures of implicit carbon pricing to overcome the motivated reasoning that
hinders public support for explicit carbon pricing.
IV. MOTIVATED REASONING AND THE PERCEIVED
EFFECTIVENESS OF CARBON TAXES
Directed motivated reasoning refers to the human tendency to hold beliefs in order to
pursue specific goals other than accuracy,68 and it is often a product of unconscious
and automatic processes.69
Prior literature has linked motivated reasoning with differences in perception of
climate change risks.70 More recently, Lucas Jr has argued that politically orientated
motivated reasoning (ie directed motivated reasoning due to identity and ideology)
may explain Republicans’ rejection of carbon taxes in the USA.71 Below, I expand
this argument in two ways: first, by elaborating on additional reasons as to why
motivated reasoning reduces public support for carbon pricing within and outside the
USA. Second, I argue that measures of implicit carbon pricing can help overcome
public opposition to carbon pricing that is due to directed motivated reasoning.
63 Dresner et al, supra, note 5; H Sælen and SKallbekken, “AChoice Experiment on Fuel Taxation and Earmarking in
Norway” (2011) 70 Ecological Economics 2181.
64 D Klenert et al, “Making Carbon Pricing Work for Citizens” (2018) 8 Nature Climate Change 669.
65 PMR, Carbon Revenue Use (Washington, DC, World Bank 2019).
66 S Carattini et al, “Green Taxes in A Post-Paris World: Are Millions of Nays Inevitable?” (2017) 68 Environmental
and Resource Economics 97.
67 Carattini, supra, note 5.
68 JN Druckman and MC McGrath, “The Evidence for Motivated Reasoning in Climate Change Preference
Formation” (2019) 9 Nature Climate Change 111.
69 B Bénabou and J Tirole, “Mindful Economics: The Production, Consumption, and Value of Beliefs” (2016) 30
Journal of Economic Perspectives 141.
70 D Kahan et al, “The Polarizing Impact of Science Literacy and Numeracy on Perceived Climate Change Risks”
(2012) 2(10) Nature Climate Change 732.
71 Lucas Jr, supra, note 9.
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1. Energy price increases and the benefits of carbon pricing
Empirical evidence from various countries indicates that one of the reasons as to why the
public tends to reject carbon pricing is because it fears the personal costs of this policy.72
Douenne and Fabre find that the perceived personal costs of the measure represent critical
factors that affect acceptance.73 This article also finds that people tend to overestimate the
impact that carbon pricing has on their households (compared to estimated effects). These
findings confirm previous research that shows a correlation between self-interest –
measured in the number of cars owned – and the acceptance of carbon taxes in a
post-ballot vote survey.74
Research on directed motivated reasoning suggests that people tend to update their
beliefs less when they receive negative news than when exposed to positive news.75
When a government proposes a carbon tax, citizens that fear energy price increases
may engage in directed motivated reasoning and update little (or not update) their
beliefs on the climate and non-climate benefits of carbon pricing, even when exposed
to information that points in this direction. Fear for the personal costs of carbon
pricing can thus contribute to public underestimation of the benefits of carbon
pricing. A recent survey experiment provides some evidence that supports this
hypothesis. Douenne and Fabre find that respondents that oppose an increase in the
tax rate of the French carbon tax update less their belief about the impact of the
measure on their households when informed that the measure is likely to have a
positive impact on their disposable income than when they are informed that the
measure would worsen their financial situation.76 These results indicate that people
that oppose carbon taxes are more likely to reject positive information on the effects
of the policy relative to negative information. A similar effect may occur regarding
the environmental effects of carbon taxes.
One could argue that the opposite effect could occur, too (ie people focus on the
benefits of carbon pricing and do not update their beliefs regarding its costs). While
possible, there are reasons to believe that motivated reasoning will tend to work in
the direction of rejecting information on the benefits of carbon pricing. A key reason
for this is the temporal distribution of costs and benefits of carbon pricing. The
introduction of a carbon price will increase energy prices from the outset and deliver
climate benefits in a more extended period.77 Mitigation benefits do not necessarily
occur immediately after the government reforms environmental taxes. Although
carbon pricing can reduce fuel consumption in the short term, some of the abatements
induced by this policy will take place only when businesses replace existing polluting
assets with greener ones.78 The investments can take decades, and their viability may
72 Carattini et al, supra, note 5.
73 Douenne and Fabre, supra, note 60.
74 P Thalmann, “The Public Acceptance of Green Taxes: 2Million Voters Express Their Opinion” (2004) 119 Public
Choice 179.
75 Z Kunda, “The Case for Motivated Reasoning” (1990) 108 Psychological Bulletin 480.
76 Douenne and Fabre, supra, note 60.
77 Pigato, supra, note 12.
78 JD Jenkins, “Political Economy Constraints on Carbon Pricing Policies: What Are the Implications for Economic
Efficiency, Environmental Efficacy, and Climate Policy Design?” (2014) 69 Energy Policy 467.
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depend on future technological advancements. Relatedly, some of the co-benefits (eg
improved air quality) may not necessarily occur in the short term. In addition, the
benefits of carbon pricing from carbon revenue use depend on the specific spending
plan. For instance, if governments distribute revenues via cash transfers, citizens may
benefit in the short term.79 However, if governments use revenues for green spending,
some of the benefits are delayed, at least the climate ones. The temporal distribution
of the cost and benefits of carbon pricing can make the costs more salient in the
minds of citizens than the benefits, thus triggering directed motivated reasoning that
prevents the education of the public regarding the benefits of these policies. In
addition, many of the benefits of carbon pricing are more diffuse and less tangible
than energy price increases. It is thus plausible that the energy price increases will
tend to be more salient in citizens’ minds and induce people to engage in motivated
reasoning that reduces support for explicit carbon pricing.
A public debate or a campaign on the environmental effects of (existing) implicit
carbon prices can help address this problem because it does not, by itself, threaten a
fuel price increase. Therefore, this debate may enable policymakers to educate people
about the virtues of carbon pricing by discussing the existing fiscal framework,
without the need to push for a policy change. After governments persuade citizens
about the benefits of carbon pricing, the latter may become less opposed to the
introduction of a carbon tax or an ETS at a later stage.
Notice that there are two reasons as to why learning about the benefits of implicit
carbon pricing can induce people to trust more in the effectiveness of explicit carbon
pricing after the government announces the intention to introduce the latter measure.
First, if citizens have more confidence in the environmental effects of carbon pricing
before hearing about the benefits of carbon taxes and ETSs, they may end up holding
more positive expectations about the environmental effects of these policies, even if
they update this belief as much as they would have done if they had not heard about
implicit carbon pricing first. Second, when people trust in the environmental effects
of carbon pricing more before learning about carbon taxes and ETSs, they may
update their beliefs more when hearing about the benefits of these measures. To
illustrate this point, a person that is very sceptical of the environmental effects of
carbon taxes may perceive evidence that counters this belief as weak. This person
may hence update their belief less when confronted with such evidence than a person
that trusts more in the effectiveness of carbon taxes and ETSs.80 Notice that, in this
case, the low magnitude of the update can result from a desire to reach accurate
beliefs or to maintain a prior belief. In both cases, persuading citizens about the
benefits of carbon pricing before announcing the intention to introduce a carbon tax
or an ETS may induce citizens to update more their beliefs regarding the benefits that
these measures can yield.
79 PMR, supra, note 65.
80 Evidence of this “prior attitude effect” outside of the context of climate change is provided in CG Lord, L Ross and
MR Lepper, “Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered
Evidence” (1979) 37 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 2098. For a discussion of the prior attitude effect in
the context of climate change communication, see Druckman and McGrath, supra, note 68.
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To implement a campaign of this type, governments need to produce reliable estimates
of the benefits of carbon pricing, if necessary by also relying on collaborations with
institutions that have a strong capacity to produce such estimates, such as the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank. Communication campaigns could then aim
to help the public to associate these benefits with carbon pricing.
2. Identity, values and the benefits of carbon pricing
Peoplemay update less (or not update) their beliefs about the environmental effectiveness
of carbon taxes because they pursue identity-protective goals.81 Some studies suggest that
people reject information on climate change when this is presented in a fashion that
threatens self-identity.82 For instance, conservatives may become more open to
environmental issues when this information conforms with their moral commitments
than when the same issues conform to moral standards that appeal more to liberals.
An alternative hypothesis (the cultural cognition hypothesis) is that people reject
climate change-related information that is incompatible with their and their peers’
values and identities because this information is a threat to their social standing.83 A
person derives benefits (material and psychological) from their peers, and holding
beliefs that are compatible with theirs helps people to acquire or maintain status in
their groups.84 In the context of carbon pricing, individuals that hold free-market
values and feel that carbon taxes are not in line with these values may reject
information on the benefits of these policies. Experimental evidence supports this
hypothesis. In an incentivised study, Cherry and co-authors find that worldviews are
a key factor associated with the rejection of carbon taxes among people that hold
hierarchical/individualistic worldviews.85 Scholarship refers to motivated reasoning
that is due to these dynamics as politically motivated reasoning.
I argue that a public discourse on implicit carbon pricing may induce citizens to
perceive carbon pricing less as a partisan policy in countries where fuel tax and fossil
fuel subsidy reforms are less partisan than carbon taxes themselves.86 An example of
this situation is the US context, where existing energy taxes are likely to be perceived
as less politically charged instruments than carbon taxes and ETSs. Historically, both
Democratic and Republican governments have introduced fuel taxes, and thus the two
main parties in the US political scene can take credit for any climate and non-climate
benefits that these policies may produce. Moreover, some of these taxes have been in
81 Lucas Jr, supra, note 9.
82 M Feinberg and R Willer, “The Moral Roots of Environmental Attitudes” (2013) 24 Psychological Science 56.
83 RK Garrett, “Strategies for Countering False Information and Beliefs about Climate Change” in Oxford Research
Encyclopedia of Climate Science (2017).
84 DKahan, “Ideology,Motivated Reasoning, and Cognitive Reflection: An Experimental Study” (2013) 8 Judgment
and Decision Making 407.
85 TL Cherry, S Kallbekken and S Kroll, “Accepting Market Failure: Cultural Worldviews and the Opposition to
Corrective Environmental Policies” (2017) 85 Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 193.
86 Notice that, in some countries, public opposition to fuel subsidy reforms might be more politically contentious than
carbon taxes and ETSs. For instance, in 2017, protests erupted inMexico against a sharp cut in fossil fuel subsidies; see D
Agren, “Mexico Protests: How Gas Prices Lit the Flame Under a Quietly Smoldering Rage” (The Guardian, 9 January
2017) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/09/mexico-gasoline-price-protest-gasolinazo>.
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place for decades, introduced by politicians who may no longer be part of the political
scene. To the extent that this strategy works, citizens may become more open to learning
about the non-climate benefits of carbon pricing andmay be less averse to explicit carbon
pricing at a later stage.
There is one crucial exception to this hypothesis. Individuals that hold hierarchical/
individualistic worldviews tend to be sceptical of climate change risks and tend to be
more worried about the economic burden that climate change mitigation policies may
impose on productive activities.87 It might, therefore, be the case that discussing fuel
taxes as carbon prices does not help to close the gap between the perceived and
actual environmental benefits of carbon taxes among individuals that hold
hierarchical/individualistic worldviews. It is also possible that if hierarchical/
individualistic individuals start perceiving fuel taxes as climate change policies, their
support for these measures decreases (the communication strategy would backfire).
Empirical evidence on this effect is needed, however. Findings that point in this
direction would recommend adopting specific communication strategies that
overcome this barrier. Below, I discuss three options that look in this direction.
A first option would be to avoid discussing the climate-related benefits of fuel taxes
and fossil fuel subsidy reforms and limit the public debate to their co-benefits. This
approach might prevent citizens that hold hierarchical/individualistic worldviews from
rejecting information about the co-benefits of carbon pricing because there will be no
reference made to the climate effects of these instruments. However, this approach
may also reduce support for implicit (and explicit) carbon pricing among individuals
that are in favour of more ambitious policy action on climate change mitigation.
Which of the two approaches, if any, yields greater public support for carbon pricing
may depend on context, such as on the proportions of hierarchical/individualistic and
communitarian/egalitarian individuals in the population reached by the
communication campaign.
Second, a potential strategy to overcome politically motivated reasoning is to
communicate climate change-related information using a two-channel strategy, as
suggested by Kahan and co-authors.88 While the first channel focuses on furnishing
accurate and scientifically sound information, the second channel focuses on cultural
meanings to ensure that the information is presented so that it does not threaten the
standing of the individual in its group. In the context of carbon pricing, highlighting
that revenues from energy taxes can support activities that facilitate entrepreneurship
and commerce, such as reducing taxes on capital89 or finance infrastructure projects
that enable trade growth (eg increasing ports capacity), may activate the second
channel. Empirical evidence from climate change communication suggests that this
strategy might be successful. Kahan and co-authors find that exposing survey
87 D Kahan et al, “The Polarizing Impact of Science Literacy and Numeracy on Perceived Climate Change Risks”
(2012) 2 Nature Climate Change 732.
88 D Kahan et al, “Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: Testing a Two-Channel Model of Science
Communication” (2015) 658 Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 192.
89 Some research suggests that reducing taxes on capital can deliver a double dividend: increased economic activity
and reduced pollution. See LH Goulder, “Environmental Taxation and the Double Dividend: A Reader’s Guide” (1995)
2 International Tax and Public Finance 157.
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respondents to information about geoengineering as a potential solution to climate
change increases the acceptance of information on climate change risks among
individuals that uphold hierarchical/individualistic worldviews.90 Stressing
geoengineering as a potential solution to climate change highlights that addressing
climate change does not necessarily harm commerce and industry development, and it
is thus more appealing to individuals that hold hierarchical/individualistic
worldviews.91 Policymakers might be able to achieve similar results by providing
information on carbon revenue spending that is pro-industry/commerce.
A third, potentially complementary, strategy consists of making sure that experts on
both sides of the value/identity spectrum deliver the information on the climate benefits
and co-benefits of implicit carbon pricing – so-called pluralistic advocacy. When
bipartisan experts support the truthfulness of the information, people may perceive it
as less threatening to their identity/values, and may thus be more open to accepting
it.92 As mentioned above, the possibility of implementing this strategy is contingent
on the political situation of each country.
Notice that the effectiveness of these three strategies at overcoming politically
motivated reasoning remains an empirical question that calls for empirical investigations.
V. A GENERAL CHALLENGE AND A POTENTIAL SOLUTION
In the previous section, I have discussed why measures of implicit carbon pricing could
be used to overcome motivated reasoning that induces the public to reject information on
the climate and non-climate benefits of carbon pricing. In this section, I discuss a general
reason as to why communicating with the public about implicit carbon pricing may not
increase public support for explicit carbon pricing and a possible solution to this problem.
A public debate on implicit carbon pricing may induce people to believe that existing
implicit carbon prices are sufficient to address climate change and thus increase public
opposition to the introduction of new carbon prices. This risk exists because the
communication regarding implicit carbon prices would highlight that other
instruments that are already in place in the jurisdiction have mitigation effects that are
similar to those of explicit carbon prices (ie they both result in a marginal incentive
to reduce carbon emissions).
One way to mitigate this risk is to inform the public that other countries impose much
higher implicit carbon prices than those imposed domestically. This communication
strategy can be easily implemented in many developed countries, including the USA
and the EU. Recent IMF estimates show that implicit carbon prices are much higher
in some low-income countries (especially African countries) than in most Western
countries because, in the former, most of the emissions come from the road transport
sector, and road transport fuels are heavily taxed.93
90 Kahan et al, supra, note 88.
91 ibid.
92 D Kahan, “Fixing the Communications Failure” (2010) 463 Nature 296.
93 IMF, supra, note 2.
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Informing the public about the higher implicit carbon prices implemented abroad could
trigger a positive response in the population towards these instruments because learning
that others are contributing more to public goods can induce people to increase their own
contributions, as well as in the context of global commons, such as climate change
mitigation.94 Ostrom proposes that a proportion of the global population is composed
of conditional cooperators (ie of individuals that are willing to mitigate climate
change as long as they believe that others will reciprocate fairly).95 Studies on public
goods games in the lab, as well as evidence from studies on peer effects on
cooperation on climate change mitigation,96 support this claim. In the context of the
present article, informing citizens that other countries have more ambitious implicit
carbon prices in place may induce greater acceptance of carbon prices in the
population targeted by the information campaign.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this article, I have argued that motivated reasoning contributes to maintaining low
levels of public trust in the environmental effectiveness of carbon pricing, thereby
keeping low levels of public support for these measures. In particular, my argument is
that the public may reject information on the benefits of carbon pricing because the
public perceives of carbon pricing as being incompatible with its values or identity97
or because it fears energy price increases.
The article also discusses a strategy that may help to overcome this problem, thereby
contributing to the literature on elaborating strategies to overcome public opposition to
carbon pricing.98 This article also contributes to the research on implementing the
“polluter pays” principle in climate change policy.99 I built on recent OECD and IMF
work that estimates measures of implicit carbon prices, and I argue that governments
can use these measures in communication campaigns to communicate with the public
about the benefits of carbon pricing within the existing fiscal framework, without the
need to threaten new price increases. In addition, I have argued that, in some
countries, policy instruments that price carbon implicitly tend to be less politically
polarised policies because, historically, they have been implemented by governments
supported by various political parties. Often, these measures have also been
implemented many years ago by politicians that may not be part of the current
political landscape.
94 E Ostrom, “Polycentric Systems for Coping with Collective Action and Global Environmental Change” (2010) 20
Global Environmental Change 550; S Carattini, S Levin and A Tavoni, “Cooperation in the Climate Commons” (2019)
13 Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 227.
95 ibid.
96 I Ayres, S Raseman and A Shih, “Evidence from Two Large Field Experiments That Peer Comparison Feedback
Can Reduce Residential Energy Usage” (2013) 29 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 992; Carattini et al,
supra, note 94; J Rode and AWeber, “Does Localized Imitation Drive Technology Adoption? A Case Study on Rooftop
Photovoltaic Systems in Germany” (2016) 78 Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 38.
97 Lucas Jr, supra, note 9.
98 Ayres, supra, note 18; Carattini et al, supra, note 5; Dominioni and Heine, supra, note 4; Lucas Jr, supra, note 9.
99 Heine et al, 2020, supra, note 19.
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Lastly, this article has discussed various limits to the use of measures of implicit carbon
pricing in order to overcome motivated reasoning, and it has illustrated various strategies
that may help us to overcome these limits.
The solutions proposed in this article are in line with the idea of addressing public
resistance to accurate information on risks,100 thereby enabling us (at least potentially)
to implement risk regulation that is aligned with public attitudes towards these risks.
100 Kahan et al, supra, note 15.
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